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FOURTH AMENDMENT-BALANCING
THE INTERESTS IN THIRD PARTY
HOME ARRESTS
Steagald v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981).
Last term, the Supreme Court protected the privacy interests of in-
dividuals whose homes police seek to search when pursuing the subject
of an arrest warrant. In Steagald v. United States,I the Court resolved an
important fourth amendment issue by holding that, absent exigent cir-
cumstances or consent, a law enforcement officer may not legally search
for the subject of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party without
a search warrant.2 The Steagald Court recognized that, "the right of the
people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . against unreasonable
searches and seizures ' 3 is far more important than the need for the po-
1 101 S. Ct. 1642 (1981), rev g sub nom., United States v. Gaultney 606 F.2d 540 (5th Cir.
1979).
2 This issue had previously divided the circuits. Three circuits had held that in the ab-
sence of exigent circumstances, a search warrant is required before law officers may enter the
home of a third party to execute an arrest warrant. See Government of Virgin Islands v.
Gereau, 502 F.2d 914 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); Wallace v. King, 626
F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 562 (1980); United States v. Prescott, 581
F.2d 1343 (4th Cir. 1978). In addition to the Fifth Circuit, which was ultimately reversed by
the Supreme Court in the Steagald decision, United States v. Gaultney, 606 F.2d 540 (5th Cir.
1979), two other circuits have taken the position that a search warrant is not required in such
situations if the police have an arrest warrant and reason to believe that the person to be
arrested is within the home to be searched. See United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259 (6th
Cir. 1967); United States v. Harper, 550 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 837
(1977). The Second Circuit has suggested in dictum that it subscribes to this latter view. See
United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir. 1980). The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has indicated that it would require a search warrant in such cases. See
United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d .146, 159 n.45 (1977). Two other courts of appeals have left
the issue open. See United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 41, 44 n.7 (Ist Cir. 1980); Rice v. Wolff,
513 F.2d 1280, 1292 n.7 (8th Cir. 1975), re'don othergrounds sub nom., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976). The Seventh Circuit has never considered the question.
Most modem commentators agree that a search warrant should be required in Steagald
situations. See 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 374, 384-85 (1978); Groot, Arrests in Bi-
vale Dwellings, 67 VA. L. REV. 275 (1981); Rotenberg & Tanzer, Searching for the Person to be
Seized, 35 OHIO ST. L. J. 56, 67-71 (1974); Comment, Arresting a Suspect in a Third Paroi/ Home:
What is Reasonable?, 72 J. CRIM. L. & C. 293 (1981); Note, The Neglected Fourth Amendment
Problem in Arrest Entries, 23 STAN. L. REv. 995, 997-999 (1971). But see Mascolo,Arrest Warrants
and Search Warrants: The Seizure of a Suspect in the Home of a Third Parly, 54 CONN. B. J. 299
(1980) (conclusion that search warrants should not be required in Steagald situations).
3 See U.S. CoNST. amend. IV:
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lice to conduct a warrantless search.4 The Court, however, failed to ex-
plain fully why, in this instance, the public's fourth amendment rights
outbalanced the need for a warrantless search.5 Justice Rehnquist, in
his Steagald dissent, did conduct a balancing test and concluded that the
need for a warrantless search was more important than the protection of
the privacy of a home.6 However, he gave far too little weight to the
public's fourth amendment privacy rights and too much to the need for
a warrantless search. If the majority had explicitly performed this bal-
ancing test, it not only would have reached a different result than the
dissent, but would have presented a more convincing and unassailable
argument in favor of individual privacy.
I. FACTS OF STEAGALD
In mid-January 1978, the Federal Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA) learned from a reliable informant the whereabouts of Ricky
Lyons, a fugitive wanted on federal drug charges. 7 An arrest warrant
had been issued for Lyons six months previously.8 Two days after dis-
covering Lyons' whereabouts, Agent Kelly Goodowens of the DEA,
along with eleven other police officers and federal agents, drove to the
address provided by the informant. Hoyt Gaultney and Gary Steagald
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
4 Steagald v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 1653 (1981).
5 The balancing test was first introduced in Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and
County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967). The search in Camara was an administra-
tive search in which a housing inspector from the San Francisco Department of Public Health
sought to inspect an apartment building for possible violations of the city's housing code. The
fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and the Court has said in the past that a
search or seizure without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless it falls under a carefully
defined set of circumstances. Coolidge v. New Hampshire 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971). A
search warrant is normally issued upon a showing of probable cause to believe that evidence
of a crime will be found in the place to be searched. See note 20 z)zjra. In Cawnara, however,
the reasonableness of the search was judged by a different standard than traditional probable
cause. The Court instead determined the reasonableness of the search by balancing "the need
to search against the invasion which the search entails." 387 U.S. at 537. The Court eventu-
ally used a watered-down standard for probable cause (belief that conditions in the area as a
whole were below code standards) to permit the administrative search. Id at 538.
6 Steagald v. United States, 101 S. Ct. at 1653-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
7 United States v. Gaultney, 606 F.2d 540, 542-43 (5th Cir. 1979). The informant con-
tacted an agent of the DEA and revealed that he might be able to locate Ricky Lyons. The
agent told him to call back when he could give Lyons' definite location. The informant called
the agent ten days later and gave him a telephone number in the Atlanta, Georgia, area at
which the informant claimed Lyons could be reached. Another DEA agent later contacted
the Southern Bell Telephone Company and found the address corresponding to the telephone
number given by the informant.
8 101 S. Ct. at 1644.
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were standing outside the house. After frisking both men and determin-
ing that neither was Ricky Lyons, the agents walked up to the front door
of the building.9 They encountered Gaultney's wife, who told the
agents that no one else was in the house. Nevertheless, she was told to
place her hands against the wall while an agent searched the house for
Lyons.' 0 Although Lyons was not found, the agent discovered a small
amount of what he believed to be cocaine. Goodowens sent an officer to
obtain a search warrant while he conducted a second search of the
house, which uncovered more cocaine. Pursuant to the search warrant,
a third search was conducted later that day and forty-three pounds of
cocaine were discovered. Steagald and Gaultney were then arrested and
indicted on federal drug charges."I
Prior to his trial, Steagald moved to suppress all the evidence dis-
covered during the three searches on the grounds that the officers did
not have a search warrant before entering the house. 12 At the suppres-
sion hearing, Goodowens testified that he did not obtain a search war-
rant because he believed that the arrest warrant gave him authority to
enter the house and conduct a search.13 The district court agreed and
denied the suppression motion. 14
The Fifth Circuit, in a divided opinion, affirmed the district court's
denial of Steagald's suppression motion. 15 The court of appeals relied
on its previous decision in United States v. Cravero,16 which held that when
an officer reasonably believes that the subject of a valid arrest warrant is
within premises belonging to a third party, he need not obtain a search
warrant to enter the house for the purpose of arresting the subject.' 7
The Supreme Court granted certiorari' 8 to decide whether, under the
fourth amendment, a law enforcement officer may search for the subject
9 Id
to Id
I1 United States v. Gaultney, 606 F.2d at 542. Hoyt A. Gaultney and Gary K. Steagald
were indicted for the possession of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1), and conspir-
acy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Gaultney
was also indicted for the unlawful importation of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a).
Both men were eventually convicted on these charges.
12 Steagald v. United States, 101 S. Ct. at 1645.
'3 Id
14 Id
15 United States v. Gaultney, 606 F.2d 540.
16 545 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
17 The test presented in Cravero was framed in terms of the officer's reasonable belief:
Reasonable belief embodies the same standards of reasonableness [as does probable
cause] but allows the officer, who has already been to the magistrate to secure an arrest
warrant, to determine that the suspect is probably within certain premises without an
additional trip to the magistrate and without exigent circumstances.
545 F.2d at 421.
18 449 U.S. 819 (1980).
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of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party without first obtaining
a search warrant.' 9
II. THE COURT'S RATIONALE
The Supreme Court, by a 7-2 vote, reversed the judgments of the
lower courts. Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion, which held
that a search warrant is required to protect the privacy interests of third
parties when police enter their homes in search of the subject of an ar-
rest warrant. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice White, authored the
dissenting opinion, which maintained that search warrants should not
be required in such situations because the government's need for a war-
rantless search outweighs the privacy interest of the third parties.
The majority opinion initially examined the purposes of arrest and
search warrants to determine whether an arrest warrant sufficiently pro-
tected a third person's interests in the privacy of his home. Justice Mar-
shall explained that the purpose of a warrant is to permit a neutral
judicial officer to assess whether the police have probable cause to make
an arrest or conduct a search. 20 Justice Marshall noted, however, that
arrest and search warrants serve different interests. While an arrest war-
rant protects an individual from an unreasonable seizure, a search war-
rant protects the person from an unreasonable intrusion, into his home.
When the officers entered Steagald's home they possessed an arrest war-
rant which protected Ricky Lyons from an unreasonable seizure,2 1 but
19 Steagald v. United States, 101 S. Ct. at 1644. During both the trial and the appeal of
this case the Government successfully argued that Steagald had sufficient connection with the
searched home to establish his constructive possession of the cocaine found in the home. In its
opposition to certiorari the Government specifically maintained that the searched home was
Steagald's residence. When the case reached the Supreme Court the government attempted
to argue that Steagald did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home and
urged the Court to remand the case to the district court for re-examination of that question.
The Court ruled that the government had lost its right to raise the issue because it had made
contrary assertions in the courts below. 101 S. Ct. at 1645-46.
20 Probable cause is required in order for a warrant to issue because the fourth amend-
ment states that ". . .no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause...". See note 3 supra.
Probable cause to search exists when the facts and circumstances in a given situation are
sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that seizable objects are located
at the place to be searched. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 160 (1925). See also C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
113 (1980).
In Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964), the Court noted that the police have probable
cause to arrest when, ". . . the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which
they [have] reasonable trustworthy information [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense."
21 In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975), the Court declared that,
"[t]he Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve
only a brief detention short of traditional arrest." Until Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the
Supreme Court had always held that unless a seizure was based on probable cause it was
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did nothing to protect Gary Steagald from an unreasonable invasion
and search of his home. 22 The warrant requirement was designed to
prevent the police, who are too involved with solving the crime to be
neutral, from assessing whether there is probable cause to search or
seize.23 Justice Marshall noted that Agent Goodowens' personal deter-
mination of probable cause to enter and search Steagald's home was
therefore exactly what the warrant requirement was designed to elimi-
nate.24 Since the arrest warrant involved no prior judicial determina-
tion of probable cause to search Steagald's home, Justice Marshall
reasoned that the search was no more reasonable than if the police had
had no warrant at all.2 5
When Justice Marshall examined the history of the fourth amend-
ment 26 he concluded that its framers most likely would not have sanc-
tioned the search of Steagald's home.27 The fourth amendment was
aimed against the abusive general warrants used in England and the
writs of assistance employed in the colonies. 28 The arrest warrant used
in Steagald specified only the object of the search and, thus, like the writ
of assistance and general warrant, left to the discretion of the police the
homes which should be searched.2 9 The fourth amendment, Justice
Marshall maintained was created explicitly to prevent the type of unre-
unreasonable. C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 20, at 60. In Tery, a police officer observed three
men conducting themselves in a manner that indicated they were about to commit a robbery.
Although the officer did not have probable cause he seized one of the men and patted down
his outside clothing. He discovered a pistol which he removed. He then repeated the process
on the other two men and found another pistol. Even though the officer did not have proba-
ble cause, the Court determined that the search was reasonable by applying a balancing test.
The Court concluded that protecting the officer's safety by allowing him to search for weap-
ons was more important than preventing the brief detention and pat down of the men. 392
U.S. at 30. This procedure, known as the stop and frisk, is now permitted without a warrant
or a complete showing of probable cause.
22 See note 36 & accompanying text infia for an explanation of an unreasonable search.
23 Steagald v. United States, 101 S. Ct. at 1647-48.
24 A search warrant would have resulted in a neutral judicial magistrate rather than
Agent Goodowens making the determination of probable cause.
25 101 S. Ct. at 1649.
26 Id at 1650-51. Justice Marshall also examined the common law but concluded that it
did not address the specific fact situation in Steagald. Justice Marshall noted that the com-
mon law rules evolved in a society far simpler than today's. Because crime and law enforce-
ment methods have changed considerably, the fourth amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures should be interpreted in light of today's norms. Id at
1650 n.10. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 n.33 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967).
27 101 S. Ct. at 1651.
28 Id at 1651. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 608-09 (White, J., dissenting); Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-29 (1886).
29 See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1965). See also notes 40-43 & accompany-
ing text infia.
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strained search which occurred in Steagald's home.30
Finally, Justice Marshall engaged in a very brief balancing test by
comparing the additional burden of requiring police officers to obtain a
search warrant to the individual's right to be free of unjustified intru-
sions. Without much elaboration, he concluded that the right of the
people to be secure in their homes outweighed the need for a warrantless
search. Therefore, the Court held that in order to render the Steagald
search reasonable under the fourth amendment, a search warrant was
required.A'
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that both the reasonable-
ness standard of the fourth amendment and the common law would
have permitted the search of Steagald's home.32 According to Justice
Rehnquist, the absence of a search warrant should not have been the
sole measure of the reasonableness of the search. Instead, he determined
the reasonableness of the search by using a balancing test.33
Justice Rehnquist initially asserted that the government had a com-
pelling interest in the warrantless entry of the dwelling of a third party
to execute an arrest warrant because of the inherent mobility of a fugi-
tive. Because a fugitive could flee from the dwelling at any time, Justice
Rehnquist noted that the police would have no way of knowing whether
the subject of an arrest warrant would still be in the dwelling when they
returned from obtaining a search warrant. He concluded that a search
warrant requirement under such circumstances would frustrate the gov-
ernment's compelling interest in apprehending criminals.3 4
Justice Rehnquist then argued that the interference with fourth
amendment rights of third parties whose homes are entered under the
authority of an arrest warrant was not that significant. He also pointed
out that the arrest warrant serves some of the same protective functions
as a search warrant. It assures occupants that the police are there on
30 I01 S. Ct. at 1651-52.
31 Id at 1652-53.
32 Justice Rehnquist and Justice Marshall simply differed in their interpretations of the
common law. Marshall interpreted the common law as not addressing the specific fact situa-
tion in Steagald while Rehnquist said that it did. See note 26 supra.
33 101 S. Ct. at 1654 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Asjustification for his use of the balanc-
ing test, Justice Rehnquist said, "[h]ere as in all Fourth Amendment cases reasonableness is
still the ultimate standard." He then cited three cases that used the balancing test to deter-
mine reasonableness: Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. at 537; Wyman
v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971); and Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315-16
(1978). All three of the above cases fall under the category of administrative searches, which
are exceptions to the warrant requirement. The balancing test has been used by the Court to
determine the reasonableness of these searches. See note 5 supra. Steagald, however, was an
ordinary search of an individual's home and the Court has said that such warrantless searches
are per se unreasonable. See note 5 supra. Therefore, the cases that Justice Rehnquist cites
provide little justification for using the balancing test in the Steagald case.
34 101 S. Ct. at 1654 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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official business and it limits the scope of the search to the subject of the
arrest warrant3 5
Justice Rehnquist concluded that the government's need for a war-
rantless search outweighed the public's right to be free from such an
intrusion. Since the burden placed on law enforcement officers who
would have to obtain a search warrant in Steagald situations was greater
than the interference with individual privacy interests, Justice Rehn-
quist declared that the warrantless search should have been permitted.3 6
III. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S REASONING
The Court employed sound reasoning in rightly deciding the Stea-
gald case. Under the Court's standard fourth amendment analysis, a
search of an individual's residence without a search warrant is per se
unreasonable unless it falls within a carefully defined set of exceptions.37
Since the search of Steagald's home did not fall under any of the excep-
tions to the warrant requirement, the majority concluded that a search
warrant was required in order to render the search reasonable.
The majority could have made a much more effective argument for
the unreasonableness of the Steagald search by elaborating on the bal-
ance between the governmental and individual interests. In Seagald the
majority could have conducted the balancing test by determining
whether Steagald's right to be free from a warrantless intrusion into his
home outweighed the Government's need for a warrantless search of
35 Id at 1654-55. Although Justice Rehnquist claimed that the search warrant limits the
scope of the search to the subject of the arrest warrant, there are at least two exceptions to the
warrant requirement, plain view and search incident to arrest, that can expand the scope of
the search. See general'y C. WHrrEBREAD, s.upra note 20, at 133-40, 211-26.
Under the plain view doctrine, if a police officer had already made a valid intrusion and
inadvertently discovers evidence in plain view he may seize it. See Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The United States used the plain view doctrine to justify the first
seizure of cocaine by police inside the Steagald home.
According to the search incident to arrest doctrine, when the police make a valid arrest,
they are permitted to search the arrestee and the area within his immediate control. See
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). The search is generally not valid unless it
takes place at the time and place of arrest. This doctrine was created to protect law enforce-
ment officers and to prevent destruction of evidence.
36 Id at 1655.
37 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 474-75; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at
586. The following searches are exceptions to the warrant requirement: searches incident to
a lawful arrest, United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969); consent searches, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); plain view
searches, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 447; stop and frisk, Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970), Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1; automobile searches, United States v. Santana,
427 U.S. 38 (1976), Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); hot pursuit and other
emergency searches, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307; United States v. Biswell, 406
U.S. 311 (1972); Warden v. Hayden, 387; U.S. 294 (1967); administrative searches, Camara v.
Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523.
1981] 1269
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Steagald's home. The Court usually employs the balancing test only
when it is assessing the reasonableness of a search that is an exception to
the warrant requirement.38 Although Steagald involved no warrant ex-
ceptions, the balancing test would have improved the majority's argu-
ment in three ways. First, if the balancing test were correctly employed,
it would have demonstrated the importance of protecting the public's
fourth amendment privacy rights. Secondly, it would have revealed
that the government's need to forego a search warrant in Steagald situa-
tions is not that great. Finally, it would have shown that Rehnquist
improperly assessed the weights of the two opposing interests in his un-
challenged use of the balancing test.39 The majority's position would
have been strongest if it had not only declared the Steagald search unrea-
sonable because of the lack of a search warrant, but also showed that
Steagald's privacy interests outweighed the Government's need for a
search. This section outlines how the majority could have provided this
missing step.
A. THE INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY INTERESTS
The history of the fourth amendment indicates the importance of
the public's right to be secure in their homes. As Justice Marshall noted
in Steagald, the fourth amendment was the framers' response to the
abuses of the general warrants in England and the writs of assistance in
the colonies. Writs of assistance were issued to colonial revenue officers
38 For cases in which the Court has employed the balancing test see Camara v. Municipal
Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1; United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307. But see Michigan v. Summers,
101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981) (Court applies balancing test for a seizure which did not fall under one
of the warrant exceptions).
The fourth amendment is comprised of two clauses. See note 3 supra. The first clause
protects the public from "unreasonable searches and seizures." The second clause demands
that warrants be based upon probable cause in order to be valid. See note 20 supra. The
fourth amendment does not explicitly state whether a warrant is required for a search or
seizure to be reasonable. The majority of the Court currently holds the position, however,
that a search without a warrant is per se unreasonable. The majority therefore uses the bal-
ancing test only to judge the reasonableness of a warrantless search if it involves one of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement. See note 37 supra for a list of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement.
39 For other examples ofJustice Rehnquist's balancing test see Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
436 U.S. at 325 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 516 (1978) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
Other Justices have at times agreed with Justice Rehnquist's views on warrantless
searches. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 325 (Stevens, J., dissenting), in which
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun joined in Justice Stevens' use of the balancing test;
Steagald v. United States, 101 S. Ct. at 1653-54, in which Justice White joined Justice Rehn-
quist's use of the balancing test. More than any other justice, however, Justice Rehnquist has
championed the position that a warrantless search can be shown to be reasonable through the
use of the balancing test.
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to enable them to search any home or building that they suspected con-
tained smuggled goods.4 By the mid- 1700s, the citizens of the colonies
began to rebel against this intolerable practice. In February 1761, a
famous debate occurred in Boston over the practice. During this debate,
James Otis called the writs of assistance, "the worst instrument of arbi-
trary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamen-
tal principles of law, that was ever found in an English law book. '41
The Supreme Court called this debate, "perhaps the most prominent
event which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the oppressions
of the mother country." It went on to say that the event was, "fresh in
the memories of those who achieved our independence and established
our form of government. '42 As a result the fourth amendment was di-
rected primarily toward protection from physical entry into the home.43
Since the enactment of the fourth amendment the courts have un-
waveringly upheld the right of the public to be free from unwarranted
forcible intrusions into their homes. 44 Recently, in Payton v. New York,
the Court observed that, "[t]he Fourth Amendment protects the individ-
ual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more
clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical
dimensions of an individual's home." 45
The right of the people to be free in their homes from unwarranted
forcible intrusions is an essential element of a free society. This right
was violated when the police forcibly entered Gary Steagald's home
without a search warrant. The sanctioning of such a practice would
deal a heavy blow to the privacy rights that the fourth amendment was
specifically designed to protect.
40 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 625.
41 Id
42 Id
43 In United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972), the Court
said, "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed."
44 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 630, in which the Court said that the principles
embodied in the fourth amendment
apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a
man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rum-
maging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of
his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property ...
The following are some of the many cases that have upheld the public's right to be free
from warrantless intrusions into their homes: United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (2d
Cir.), cat. deniedsub nom., Goldsmith v. United States, 439 U.S. 913 (1978); Dorman v. United
States, 435 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967); Jones
v. United States, 357 U.S. 493,498 (1958); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949); McDon-
ald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14
(1948); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20,33
(1925).
45 445 U.S. at 589.
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The framers of the fourth amendment placed the probable cause
requirement in the fourth amendment to prevent the police from indis-
criminately searching people's homes as was done under the general
warrants and writs of assistance. A neutral judicial magistrate must de-
termine probable cause in order to avoid biased decisions to search
made by law enforcers, as well as to assure the people of impartial ap-
proval of police action. In Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court
recognized that permitting the police to make a search of a home based
only upon their belief that a suspect was within would reduce "the
[Fourth] Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure
only in the discretion of police officers."'46 The warrant requirement
thus provides a safeguard from unreasonable intrusions by the police
into individual homes.
The fourth amendment protects the public from all unreasonable
searches of their homes regardless of their intrusiveness. In his dissent,
Justice Rehnquist argued that the interference with Steagald's fourth
amendment privacy rights was not significant because the police had
obtained an arrest warrant which limited the scope of their search by
specifying the object of the search.47 In Payton v. New York, however, the
Supreme Court noted that the scope of the search is not as important as
the fact that the police have breached the entrance to the individual's
home.48 The presence of an arrest warrant did nothing to protect Stea-
gald from an unreasonable intrusion into his home. In fact, if the arrest
warrant were used as intended by Agent Goodowens in Steagald, there
would be little distinction between it and the writs of assistance used
during the colonial days. The police could use a single arrest warrant to
search any home in which they believed that the suspect might be hid-
ing.49 Therefore the use of an arrest warrant to enter a third party's
home to "unintrusively" search for a suspect infringes greatly upon the
individual's right to be free of unreasonable intrusions into his home.
B. THE GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS
The primary governmental interest served by the warrantless
46 333 U.S. at 14.
47 101 S. Ct. at 1654-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
48 445 U.S. at 589.
49 Steagald v. United States, 101 S. Ct. at 1649. Although the police would be required to
make an assessment of probable cause to search before entering the home, "history shows that
the police acting on their own cannot be trusted." McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. at
456. See also Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333, 337 (3d Cir. 1974) (officer testified that in twenty-
six years on the police force he had never obtained a single search warrant); Lankford v.
Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966) (police used arrest warrants for two fugitives to search
more than 300 homes).
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search of a third party's home is assuring the capture of the suspect. 50
That goal, however, would not have been frustrated if the police had
been required to obtain a search warrant for Steagald's home. Justice
Rehnquist argued that requiring a search warrant would hinder police
efforts in apprehending suspects because of the inherent mobility of fugi-
tives.51 This argument would not apply to the Steagald case because the
police were aware of the alleged whereabouts of Ricky Lyons for two
days before they actually went to Steagald's home. The police could
easily have obtained a search warrant during the two day period preced-
ing their initial arrival at Steagald's house.52
Furthermore, a lengthy interval between a crime or a decision to
arrest and the actual arrest is not peculiar to the Steagald case. Accord-
ing to a 1967 study conducted for the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, in the majority of situations
where the police would need to enter someone's residence to apprehend
a suspect, a search warrant could be obtained and executed before the
suspect had fled.53
Even if the police had come upon Lyons' hideout without the aid of
a tip or other warning, they could have quickly obtained a search war-
rant by telephone.5 4 The police could have set up a stakeout while they
obtained the warrant in case Lyons attempted to flee the residence.55
Another governmental interest in conducting a warrantless search
50 In Terry v. Ohio, the Court recognized that effective crime prevention and detection is
a legitimate governmental interest. 392 U.S. at 22.
51 101 S. Ct. at 1649 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
52 Agent Goodowens testified that there had been no "physical hindrance" preventing
him from obtaining a search warrant and that he did not obtain one because he believed that
the arrest warrant for Ricky Lyons was sufficient to justify the entry and search. 101 S. Ct. at
1645. A more credible explanation for the absence of a search warrant is Goodowens' realiza-
tion that the information received from the informant was insufficient to convince a neutral
magistrate that there was probable cause to believe that Ricky Lyons was at the location to be
searched.
53 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 96 (1967). For a concise summary of this
study's findings see 2 W. LAFAvE, srupra note 2, at 374, 380-81 (1978).
54 101 S. Ct. at 1652. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(l)-(2).
55 In his Steagald dissent, 101 S. Ct. at 1654, Justice Rehnquist quoted from Justice
White's dissent in Paqyon v. New York which observed that "the police could reduce the likeli-
hood of escape by staking out all possible exits. . . the costs of such a stakeout seems excessive
in an era of rising crime and scarce police resources." 445 U.S. at 619.
Extensive police stakeouts will seldom be necessary since the situations in which a search
warrant will be necessary are not numerous. Steagald v. United States, 101 S. Ct. at 1652.
An arrest warrant alone is sufficient to enter the arrestee's own home in order to effect his
arrest. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 602-03. Furthermore, no warrant at all is required to
arrest a suspected felon in a public place if probable cause exists. United States v. Watson,
423 U.S. 411 (1976).
If a stakeout should become necessary it would take little time to obtain a search warrant
by telephone; the length and cost of the stakeout would thus be minimal.
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is the protection of police officers and citizens.5 6 The police and the
third parties with whom the suspect is living could be endangered if the
search warrant requirement gave the suspect more time to arm himself
in the third party home. 57 However, in most cases the police will have
established probable cause to obtain a search warrant before arriving at
the suspected hideout of the fugitive.58 The police would be at the door
before the suspect was even aware that he had been discovered. If a
situation arose where the police had to stake out a dwelling where a
dangerous suspect was hiding while they waited for a search warrant,
the exigent circumstances doctrine would allow them to forego the war-
rant requirement since it would endanger their safety and the safety of
third parties in the home.59
In his Steagald dissent, Justice Rehnquist speculated that a search
warrant requirement could cause increased uncertainty for police of-
ficers, committing magistrates, and trial judges who must decide
whether a search warrant is required when confronting variations of the
Steagald situation.60 For instance, if a suspect is believed to have been
living for a short period of time in a dwelling owned by a third party,
law enforcement officials would need to decide whether that dwelling
could be considered the suspect's home for fourth amendment purposes.
If the dwelling is considered the suspect's home, then the police could
search the dwelling without a warrant.6 1 On the other hand, if the
dwelling is not considered the suspect's home, then a search warrant
would be needed.62 If the police fear that a suspect is about to flee from
a third party's home and they do not have a search warrant, they must
decide whether the exigent circumstances doctrine will permit them to
enter without a search warrant. 63 This uncertainty places a valid bur-
56 In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 23, the Court recognized the protection of police officers
as a valid governmental interest. See Comment, supra note 2, at 315-16 for a further
discussion.
57 See Comment, supra note 2, at 315-16.
58 See notes 50-55 & accompanying text supra.
59 See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 2, at 374, 380-81. According to the exigent circumstances
doctrine if a search or seizure involves imminent danger to the police or the impending de-
struction or disappearance of possible evidence, the police are not required to obtain a war-
rant. This is one instance where the privacy protection afforded by the warrant requirement
is outweighed by the needs of effective law enforcement. See C. WHrrEBREAD, supra note 20,
at 152-53. The most common situation involving exigent circumstances is hot pursuit. For
instance, if the police witness a crime and chase the felon into a house a search warrant is not
required. See United States v. Santana 427 U.S. 38 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967).
60 101 S. Ct. at 1657 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 602-03.
62 101 S. Ct. at 1644.
63 See note 59 supra.
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den on law enforcement officials and must be considered in the balanc-
ing process.
A final governmental interest promoted by a warrantless search is
the avoidance of administrative inconvenience that would occur from a
search warrant requirement. The Supreme Court has previously sug-
gested, however, that inconvenience for law enforcement officials is not
an adequate reason to overlook fourth amendment privacy rights. 64
C. BALANCING THE INTERESTS
Bypassing the search warrant requirement in Steagald situations
would result in a serious erosion of the public's fourth amendment pri-
vacy rights. Enforcing the search warrant requirement would do noth-
ing more than cause increased uncertainty for law enforcement officials.
Protecting the privacy interests of the public is a much more important
goal than decreasing police uncertainty. The fourth amendment was
enacted to do away with the writs of assistance and general warrants.
The absence of a search warrant requirement in Steagald situations
would result in a large step back to the days when the writs of assistance
and general warrants were issued freely, and the people were "secure in
their homes only at the discretion of the police."'65 The avoidance of
uncertainty for law enforcement officials is not nearly a compelling
enough reason to justify such a drastic step.
IV. CONCLUSION
The balancing test provides an instructive method for determining
whether a search is reasonable under the fourth amendment. Instead of
simply stating that the Seagald search was unreasonable because the po-
lice did not have a warrant, the Supreme Court majority could have
balanced the interests of the public against the interests of the govern-
ment to demonstrate why the search was unreasonable. By doing so, the
majority would have shown that a search which is per se unreasonable
under its analysis does not suddenly become reasonable under a balanc-
ing test analysis. The public's fourth amendment privacy rights are
heavy, and thus they are not easily outweighed.
G. ANDREW WATSON
64 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. at 15.
65 See note 46 supra.
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